Mr. Inman appealed convictions of second degree assault with sexual motivation and second degree rape involving his wife of 19 years. His wife testified that Mr. Inman hit her in the right eye with a tennis ball as she walked into their home upon returning from work. Mr. Inman made comments implying he wanted sex, but she indicated she was too tired. Mr. Inman then dragged his wife up a set of stairs by her ponytail, restrained her in their bed, and raped her. Mr. Inman denied the allegations and claimed his wife was lying about the assault and rape. Alternatively, he argued that if an assault occurred there was not a substantial injury for Assault 2, even though she received a black eye that was observed by several people.
This case should be published because it provides guidance to the public and professionals through its discussion of double jeopardy: Mr. Inman’s separate second degree assault and second degree rape convictions do not violate double jeopardy. Double jeopardy protects against multiple punishments for the same offense under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, Section 9 of the Washington State Constitution. It is not double jeopardy when a defendant’s convictions punish two different offenses. State v. Ray, 5 Wn.3d 359, 362 (2025).
Division II used a four-part analysis under State v. Ray: (1) Is there an indication of the legislative intent to impose separate punishments for the same conduct. Ray, 363-64. The State, on appeal, conceded there was no such indication of authorizing separate punishments for Assault 2 and second degree rape; (2) whether the two offenses are the same in fact and law. Ray, at 367. This is known as the ‘Blockburger Test.’ Division II did not spend much time on this factor as Assault 2 involves intentional, substantial bodily harm and second degree rape involves forced sexual intercourse; (3) is there ‘merger’ of the offenses. Merger is usually found when the “degree of one offense is raised by conduct separately criminalized.” State v. Arwdt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 819 (2019). Merger does not occur when overlapping offenses have independent purposes or effects. Id. Here, Mr. Iman hitting the victim with a tennis ball was different than restraining the victim in their bed to force sex. The ‘sexual motivation’ component of the tennis ball being thrown did not make the assault merge with the rape. Division II held that the State’s argument that Mr. Inman was “continually” assaulting the victim throughout the episode (defense thereby claiming one long act should not be two separate crimes) was simply “inartful”; and (4) was there other legislative intent known that could overcome the Blockburger presumption? Mr. Inman did not argue there were such indicators of legislative intent that his charges could not be punished separately.
The rest of this unpublished appellate opinion mainly deals with a very “frustrated” trial judge dealing with the defense springing new evidence and witnesses on the eve of trial, plus Mr. Inman ‘suddenly’ becoming sick and hospitalized for a blood sugar problem. The trial judge was so exasperated regarding discovery violations that he advised Mr. Inman’s lawyer to “just…stop talking!” The judge had to make many evidentiary rulings on the fly without real preparation. Division II did not believe the trial judge’s strident comments were unfair or otherwise prejudicial to defense counsel.
Mr. Inman may be arguing ineffective assistance of counsel on a personal restraint petition. This unpublished opinion is a helpful illustration of when two different acts in one episode should result in two separate criminal charges.