Mr. Jeffries-Porter pleaded guilty to one count of Child Molestation in the First Degree in violation of RCW 9A.44.083. He was sentenced to 51 months in prison and 36 months of community supervision, to start upon prison release, including “possess/access no sexually exploitive materials (as defined by Defendant’s treating therapist or CCO).”
The Washington Supreme Court, in an En Banc 6–3 decision, found this condition was unconstitutionally vague. While “trial courts have discretion to impose all sorts of conditions of release to protect the public,” and to “delegate supervision of conditions to experts,” Jeffries-Porter, pg 1, the conditions need to be “narrowly tailored and directly related to the goals of protecting the public and promoting rehabilitation.” Jeffries-Porter, pg 2.
The majority held that “sexually exploitive can mean many different things,” and “the State offered several competing definitions.” Id., pg 2. As applied to Mr. Jeffries-Porter, “of all the appellate court decisions that have considered the constitutionality of this condition, not one has been able to define what it means in this context” [i.e. as applied to Mr. Jeffries-Porter].
The WA Court of Appeals, in a split unpublished decision, previously upheld Mr. Jeffries-Porter’s condition. The Supreme Court appears to have agreed with the dissent: sexually exploitative materials does not explain to a person of ordinary intelligence what materials were off-limits,” Id., pg 7, and does not “actually provide a definition” of the phrase. Id., pg 8. The majority further recognized that Mr. Jeffries-Porter’s Judgment and Sentence and appendices did not define the condition, nor did any independent statute or appellate decision. Id., at 12. No appellate court has ever “actually defined that term.” Id., at 13.
The Washington Supreme Court specifically noted that the State changed its proposed definition at oral argument. The court further acknowledged uncertainty as to whether the condition refers to “materials concerning persons, materials concerning minors, materials concerning actual live and photographed or videoed acts, or materials concerning simulated acts.” Id., at 14.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to clarify the community supervision condition concerning sexual exploitive materials. Chief Justice Stephens, writing for a 3 person minority, held Mr. Jeffries-Porter had “sufficient notice . . . that he may not access materials depicting the sexual exploitation of children. Such materials are not protected by the First Amendment and provides sufficient guidance not to be vague.”
This opinion involved a lot of analysis and legal work. The trial court will very likely try to be clear by writing out a long ‘definition’ of sexually exploitative materials, but this writer’s question is whether Mr. Jeffries-Porter can then complain about the potential prohibition of legal adult pornography.