Tales From The Trenches State v. Kuria (Div. 1, Unpublished) Insufficient Basis for Downward Departure From Sentencing Guidelines in Child Molest Case

Mr. Kuria was 18 at the time of his admitted molestation of a 7 year old. For reasons only known to Mr. Kuria and his counsel, he chose to go to trial, rather than immediately seek a Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (“SSOSA”). After he was convicted by a jury, he presented a “SSOSA evaluation” to the trial judge at sentencing seeking supervision of suspend the guideline range of 51–68 months. The Court found the SSOSA evaluation “far from ideal,” as it did not adhere to the very specific requirements of RCW 9.94A.670 (regulating SSOSA sentences). The Court questioned whether Mr. Kuria was amenable to treatment as a sex offender, as he denied molesting the 7 year old, did not discuss the incident with the evaluator, and the evaluator did not include a detailed treatment plan. However, instead of rejecting the SSOSA request, the Court continued sentencing, allowing Mr. Kuria to supplement the evaluation or make a different sentencing recommendation.

At the follow-up hearing, Mr. Kuria abandoned his SSOSA request and sought an exceptional sentence of 10 months in custody, claiming his youth and unstable living situations were sufficient mitigating factors for a downward departure. Over a strong State objection, the Court agreed to the exceptional sentence.

Mr. Kuria then appealed his conviction, claiming juror bias and ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Kuria claimed his lawyer should have used a peremptory challenge to excuse a juror expressing reluctance about the case because she had children about the same age as the alleged victim. Division 1 denied these claims quickly, as many jurors expressed the same reservation and concern about keeping an open mind.

The State successfully appealed the exceptional downward departure of ten months by claiming Mr. Kuria presented no evidence that his conduct was due to the classic, documented qualities of youth, such as immaturity, impulsivity, or failure to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Indeed, the molestation appeared calculated. Mr. Kuria waited for all adults and his 17 year old sister to leave the cramped apartment, tricked the 7 year old to come into a bedroom and closed the door, and used his age and position of trust to manipulate her. Division 1 agreed with the State that Mr. Kuria did not utilize the “youth factors” in State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 695–96 (2015), to demonstrate that there were “mitigating qualities of youth [that] impaired . . . ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.” O’Dell, at 694. Division 1 recognized the upheaval in Mr. Kuria’s life, such as moving to Kenya and then back to the U.S., but found the “trial court did not explain how this evidence impaired Kuria’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.” Kuria, at 20. The trial court found Mr. Kuria’s molestation was impulsive, but did not explain how the evidence at trial demonstrated impulsivity. Similarly, the trial court’s recognition that Mr. Kuria had a “short window of time [that] showed a failure to appreciate the risks of his actions” was not really a mitigating factor, as “failure to choose ideal conditions to perpetrate a crime or to fully appreciate the risk of getting caught.” Kuria, at 21.

Mr. Kuria admitted his wrongdoing when confronted by his caretaker a few days later. Only he and his counsel know why he chose a trial over seeking a SSOSA, or seeking a psychological evaluation with full social workup that could have supported an exceptional downward departure for an 18 year old. The State would likely have been open to either of these possibilities, but not if one risks going to trial and putting the 7 year old through the trauma of confrontation. Division 1 granted the State’s appeal request: Mr. Kuria must be sentenced within the range of 51–68 months.