The facts here are sickening and egregious, which is why anyone knowing what Mr. Tarver did as a caseworker for the Washington Department of Children, Youth & Families (‘DCYF’) would have no problem with him obtaining a criminal conviction. He obtained favors from a mother who had her seven children removed from her custody in a dependency action. Child Protective Services received a report that the mother’s boyfriend had physically abused one of the children. All seven children were removed. Mr. Tarver was given the task of helping the mother obtain a protection order against the boyfriend. He went to court with her and assisted in presenting the petition for protection order. Upon the court signing the order, Mr. Tarver accompanied the mother “home for her safety.”
Mr. Tarver stayed for several hours at this woman’s home, during which he had sexual contact with her. After midnight, Mr. Tarver announced he was going back to his office to work on the mother’s case. He spoke in a “manner and tone signifying his being in the best position within [DCYF] to facilitate the return of the children.” The next day, Mr. Tarver did arrange a visit, without a visitation supervisor. However, at the next court hearing regarding the children’s removal, he testified the children would not be safe with the mother! With the assistance of the mother’s attorney, the mother then reported the sexual contact with Mr. Tarver to the police the next day.
The dependency hearing resumed a few days later. Mr. Tarver denied having sex with the mother in exchange for helping her on her CPS case. He denied he had been to her house after obtaining the protection order! He denied bringing alcohol to her house.
He was charged with unlawful compensation (RCW 9A.68.030) which forbids a public servant from “compensation” for assisting in preparing a “transaction” which the public servant has official discretion to exercise. He was also charged with second degree extortion and first degree perjury. At a subsequent bench trial he was acquitted of the extortion count, but convicted of perjury and receiving unlawful compensation. He only appealed the unlawful compensation conviction, arguing “sexual contact” is not “compensation” and a “transaction” does not include parent-child visitation on a dependency case.
At bench trial the court concluded:
“On July 9, 2024, Robert Tarver, being a public servant, requested and accepted sexual contact from R.J. and such contact was compensation within the meaning of RCW 9A.68.030(1)(a).”
On review, Division III concluded “compensation” did encompass sexual contact and “transaction” included working on a dependency case and arranging visitation with one’s child. This result is defensible by looking at the common dictionary definition of compensation; it is broader than just pecuniary benefit. However, the extortion statute that Mr. Tarver was acquitted of specifically included “sexual favors” as a means of “compensation.” Mr. Tarver’s argument was the legislature knew how to write sexual favors into a bribery statute, but chose not to include it in the definition of a similar crime. A decent argument. The classic “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” In other words, the silence of the legislature was purposeful; ‘sexual favor’ was not a form of “compensation” for purposes of the public servant compensation statute.
Still, it’s hard not to view Mr. Tarver’s actions as one where the mother was ‘paying him’ with the expectation of a favorable result.
The court defined “transaction” broadly: a “transaction” is “a communicative action or activity involving two parties… reciprocally affecting or influencing each other” Id, pg 12. This is a Webster Dictionary definition. The future problem here is that almost any interaction between a public servant and member of the public could be a transaction.
However, the decision is right on its facts because Mr. Tarver exercised his power over the mother’s visitation and gave testimony intended to influence the court. That’s a strong, actual transaction wherein the mother believed her ‘compensation’ would merit favorable treatment.
An unusual and horrible fact pattern wherein the State likely searched for the right charges to impose, where none (except for the perjury!) was an exact fit to describe Mr. Tarver’s acts. Mr. Tarver received 14 months in prison.